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Abstract 
The beginning of the 21st century rocked financial markets with a series of catastrophic corporate scandals and financial meltdowns.  
First came the wave of corporate governance failures of Enron, Adelphia, WorldCom and Tyco only to be followed, not even a decade 
later, by the massive credit crisis that caused the bankruptcies of Lehman Brothers and Washington Mutual Bank.  These financial 
meltdowns were caused in part by poor management oversight, a failure of corporate governance and self-interested CEO’s who were 
more focused on their massive paychecks and bonuses than on protecting shareholder value.  Each crisis caused a reactionary move-
ment towards restructuring corporate governance and policy to satiate growing stakeholder pressures to reform the system.  The Sar-
banes Oxley Act and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act were intended to transform the rules and close 
any loopholes in order to prevent such economic atrocities from happening ever again.  The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act included a particular disclosure – the Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule – that mandated publicly traded companies 
to produce executive compensation specifics starting in their 2018 filings.  The ratio is essentially the median of the annual total 
compensation of all the company’s employees, except the CEO, divided by the CEO’s total annual compensation.  This paper assesses 
the new rule’s potential impact on CEO compensation through an empirical literary review on Corporate Social Responsibility, stake-
holder theory, equity theory, stewardship theory, agency theory and organization theory.  
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In 2008, the United States was in the grip of a recession as evidenced 
by severe levels of unemployment and collapsing stock prices (Mitchell, 
2015).  In the midst of the crisis, the two largest bankruptcies in U.S. his-
tory occurred involving Washington Mutual Bank and Lehman Brothers 
Holdings, Inc.  These events contributed to Congress passing the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank 
Act”) in 2010, which in section 953(b) required the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (“SEC”) to disseminate a Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule 
(Saverino, 2016).  The new rule required publicly traded companies to re-
port three numbers (a) the median of the annual total compensation of all 
the firm’s employees, except the Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”), (b) the 
annual total compensation of the firm’s CEO, and (c) the ratio of those 
two amounts (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2015).  
Stories about excessive CEO pay have pervaded the news media for 
nearly three decades and the discourse has only intensified since passage 
of the Dodd-Frank Act.  A few examples of media headlines in recent 
years include: “CEO Pay Has Grown 90 Times Faster Than Typical 
Worker Pay Since 1978” (Mishel, & Davis, 2015); “CEOs Make 335 
Times What Workers Earn” (Nicks, 2016); “Top CEOs Make More in 
Two Days Than an Average Employee Does in One Year” (Donnelly, 
2017); and “If the CEO’s High Salary Isn’t Justified To Employees, Firm 
Performance May Suffer” (Gerdeman, 2018).  At the beginning of 2018, 
the new Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule went into effect and publicly traded 
firms must begin reporting the pay ratio disclosures (Securities and Ex-
change Commission, 2017) so that all interested stakeholders can see 
them.  Will the new rule solve the issue and result in lower CEO pay?  This 
review of the empirical literature searches for clues and develops proposi-
tions about the effect of the new rule. 
Corporate Social Responsibility, Stakeholder Theory 
and CEO Pay 
Perspectives on why businesses exist went through a tremendous trans-
formation over the past 75 years.  Beginning with the end of WWII and 
ending in the late 1960s, a managerial view of the firm dominated 
(Drucker, 1974/1985) whereby management’s focus was on production in 
order to achieve maximum firm performance.  By the end of the 1960’s 
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an increasing number of institutions were investing in the stock market 
and these investors began pressuring corporate leaders for more of a say 
in how firms were being run (Gulati, Mayo, & Nohria, 2017).  This pro-
duced a shift towards a shareholder view of the firm (Fligstein, 2001) 
whereby management’s focus was on achieving the highest stock market 
valuation in order to satisfy current investors and to attract new investors.  
In the midst of these changes, society and governments were pressuring 
firms to do more than merely satisfy the need for profits and goods (Acker-
man, & Bauer, 1976).  Increasingly, firms were being expected to exhibit 
corporate social responsibility (“CSR”).  In other words, to concern them-
selves with broader constituencies such as employees, customers, inves-
tors, vendors, the immediate community, and the larger community such 
as state and federal governments, non-government organizations, and the 
media (Ackerman, & Bauer, 1976).  This pressure from constituents, com-
bined with the development of social media and growing internet use, pro-
ceeded another shift, this time toward a stakeholder view of the firm.  Free-
man (1984) explained that a stakeholder is “any group or individual who 
can affect or is affected by the achievement of an organization’s purpose” 
(p. 25).  A recent case study, which involved two energy companies, 
Exxon Corporation (“Exxon”) and British Petroleum (“BP”), provides 
support for a stakeholder view of the firm.  Exxon and BP were both in-
volved in oil spills, Exxon in 1989 and PB in 2010.  The researchers, van 
Halderen, Bhatt, Berens, Brown, & van Riel (2016) concluded that when 
faced with stakeholder pressure, companies gradually give in to stake-
holder demands regarding CSR initiatives.   
Considering the Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule and its effect on stakehold-
ers, Mohan, Schlager, Deshpande, and Norton (2016) studied one group 
of stakeholders, consumers.  They found that a low pay ratio resulted in 
improved perceptions for most consumers, while the remaining consum-
ers’ perceptions were unharmed (Mohan, et al., 2016).  Further, consumers 
were willing to pay more for products when the producing company 
showed a lower pay ratio.  Consumers wanted to pay less for products 
produced by companies with higher pay ratios (Mohan, et al., 2016).  An-
other study showed support for the idea that the Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule 
may result in lower CEO pay.  Kelly and Seow, (2016) found that report-
ing a higher-than-industry pay ratio may create negative perceptions of 
CEO pay fairness and shame companies into keeping CEO pay levels re-
strained.  Additionally, they found that disclosure of a higher-than-indus-
try pay ratio that increases over time has an indirect negative effect on 
investor perceptions.  This may incentivize firms to restrain CEO pay in 
order to improve investor perception of CEO pay fairness. (Kelly & Seow, 
2016). 
Not everyone agrees, Saverino (2016) suggested that the Pay Ratio Dis-
closure Rule will not be effective and recommended a soft pay cap where 
“the SEC would mandate annually that the CEOs receive compensation in 
an amount not to exceed ‘X’ percent of the companies’ net income” (p. 
561).  According to Larcker, Donatiello, and Tayan (2016), 74 percent of 
American’s believe that CEOs are paid too much and 70 percent believe 
it is a problem.  Furthermore, 62 percent of Americans believe CEO pay 
should somehow be capped (Larcker, Donatiello, & Tayan, 2016).  To top 
it all off, Americans vastly underestimate the amount CEOs are paid 
(Larcker, Donatiello, & Tayan, 2016). 
We argue that a majority of American’s want the gap between CEO 
compensation and the average worker’s compensation to decrease.  This 
expectation from the public in conjunction with the Pay Ratio Disclosure 
Rule will embarrass company boards into making the pay gap issue into a 
CSR initiative.  However, it is unlikely that firms will increase average 
worker pay until it is more acceptably in line with CEO pay due to the 
enormous cost.  Therefore, the authors predict that publicly traded firms 
will gradually give in to stakeholder demands to close the pay gap by low-
ering CEO pay as the public becomes more informed about the reality of 
CEO compensation.   In addition, there is some evidence that certain stake-
holder’s favor lower CEO pay ratios.  For example, consumers prefer to 
buy products from manufacturers with lower pay ratios and research sug-
gest that the perceived investment potential of a firm is diminished by a 
higher-than-industry pay ratio over time.  For these reasons, the new Pay 
Ratio Disclosure Rule will result in successful downward pressure on 
CEO pay.  That is, it will be negatively related to CEO pay (see Figure 1).   
 
Proposition 1: The Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule is negatively related to 
CEO pay at publicly traded firms. 
 
Gebaix and Landier (2008) found the growth in average firm size be-
tween 1980 and 2003 accounted for about half of the rise in CEO pay dur-
ing those years.  They hypothesized that the remaining difference was due 
to overpayment of CEOs by a small number of firms, which further exac-
erbated the rise in CEO pay (Gebaix, & Landier, 2008) deepening the pay 
inequality between CEOs and between average workers and CEOs. 
Equity Theory 
Adams (1963) defined inequity as existing for a person (or group of 
people) whenever his or her perceived job inputs and/or outcomes stand 
psychologically in an obverse relation to what he or she perceives are the 
inputs and/or outcomes of some other person (or group of people).  Adams 
(1963) theorized the following: first, a “person may increase his inputs if 
they are low relative to [another's] inputs and to his own outcomes” (p. 
427).  Second, a “person may decrease his inputs if they are high relative 
to [another's] inputs and to his own outcomes” (p. 428).  Third, a “person 
may increase his outcomes if they are low relative to [another's] outcomes 
and to his own inputs” (p. 428).  Fourth, a “person may decrease his out-
comes if they are high relative to [another's] outcomes and to his own in-
puts” (p. 428).  Fifth, a “person may ‘leave the field’ when he experiences 
inequity of any type” (p. 428).  Sixth, a “person may psychologically dis-
tort his inputs and outcomes, increasing or decreasing them as required” 
(p. 428).  Seventh, a “person may increase, decrease, or distort the inputs 
and outcomes of others, or force [another] to leave the field” (p. 429).  
Eighth, a “person may change his referent other when inequity exists” (p. 
429).  In other words, human beings will take actions to respond to per-
ceived inequity, although the results of those actions will vary.  However, 
research studies have produced mixed results (Gupta, Conroy, & Delery, 
2012; Rouen, 2017).  For example, Shin (2016) found the earnings for 
lower paid CEOs were not impacted by the inequality of higher paid 
CEO’s.  
Rouen (2017) developed a theory to explain the discrepancies found in 
prior studies and observed that when pay disparity is explained (econom-
ically justified), then firm performance is high.  However, when pay dis-
parity is not explained (not economically justified), then firm performance 
and employee satisfaction are both lower.  What CEOs and employees 
earn at other similar firms may also play a role in perception and reaction 
to pay disparity.  Rouen (2017) theorized that the negative relation of un-
explained compensation to performance is further enhanced when the 
CEO is overpaid (received additional unexplained pay compared to CEOs 
at similar firms) and employees are underpaid (received less than expected 
pay compared to those at similar firms).  In addition to stakeholders such 
as consumers and investors applying pressure to lower CEO pay as previ-
ously discussed, employees can also apply their own pressure to lower 
CEO pay through decreased performance at work.  If unexplained pay dis-
parity between the CEO and employees can negatively affect employee 
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performance and company performance, then ultimately it will upset in-
vestors as well.  To counter stakeholder negative perceptions regarding 
unexplained pay, Rouen (2017) suggested that firms disclose detailed in-
formation to justify pay ratios economically.   
The purpose of the new Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule is to highlight exist-
ing CEO pay disparity and to make it known to a greater number of con-
stituents, in other words to make it known to as many stakeholders as pos-
sible.  Although many firms will try, the authors are not convinced that 
CEO pay disparity will be easy to justify economically.  We argue that 
any unexplained CEO pay disparity between a firm’s CEO and its employ-
ees will strengthen the effect of the Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule.  In other 
words, unexplained pay disparity will act as a moderator, increasing the 
strength of the negative relationship between the Pay Ratio Disclosure 
Rule and CEO pay by increasing the downward pressure on CEO pay (see 
Figure 1).  Further, the increased downward pressure on CEO pay will be 
even greater if the firm’s CEO also exhibits unexplained (higher) pay dis-
parity compared to the CEO of a similar firm (see Figure 1).  We therefore 
make the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2a: The negative relationship between the Pay Ratio Dis-
closure Rule and CEO pay at publicly traded companies is made more 
negative by unexplained pay disparity between the CEO’s annual total 
compensation and the median annual employee’s total compensation, 
especially if there is also unexplained (higher) pay disparity between 
the CEO’s annual total compensation and the annual total compensa-
tion of a CEO at a similar firm. 
 
CEOs, like other individuals, may find intrinsic rewards more motivat-
ing than extrinsic rewards like bonuses and other forms of compensation.  
Contributing to the betterment of society and creating a legacy for family 
and friends are powerful drivers for many corporate leaders.  Unbridled 
greed may provide a catchy storyline for a Hollywood movie, but maybe, 
just maybe it is rarer than we think.   
Stewardship Theory 
Stewardship theory claims that individuals, including corporate leaders, 
are not opportunistic and want to do ‘the right thing’ (Davis, Schoorman, 
& Donaldson, 1997; Donaldson and Davis 1991; Francoeur, Melis, Gaia, 
& Aresu, 2017).  Francoeur, Melis, Gaia, & Aresu (2017) used the Sus-
tainable Investment Research International Company (“SIRI”) for their re-
search, which specializes in socially responsible investment analysis.  
Firms included on SIRI’s SiriPro database are environmentally friendly 
(Cheng & Courtenay, 2006).  Francouer et al. (2017) found that environ-
mentally friendly firms rely less on incentive-based pay than other firms 
do, paying their CEOs less.   
The empirical literature suggests that CEOs at environmentally friendly 
firms are intrinsically motivated to act in the interests of the greater good.  
They are less motivated by extrinsic rewards such as bonuses for cutting 
costs and increasing revenues if it means damaging the environment.  This 
allows CEOs at these companies to accept lower levels of compensation 
because they are motivated primarily by being good stewards.  Therefore, 
the authors speculate that a firm’s status as environmentally friendly will 
further contribute to downward pressure on CEO pay because these firms 
place an emphasis on good stewardship, rather than on financial incen-
tives.  If a firm is classified as environmentally friendly on SIRI’s SiriPro 
database, it will strengthen the effect of the Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule.  In 
other words, a firm’s status as environmentally friendly will act as a mod-
erator, increasing the strength of the negative relationship between the Pay 
Ratio Disclosure Rule and CEO pay by increasing the downward pressure 
on CEO pay (see Figure 1). 
 
Proposition 2b: The negative relationship between the Pay Ratio Dis-
closure Rule and CEO pay at publicly traded companies is made more 
negative by a firm’s status as environmentally friendly. 
 
Thinking about stewardship at a publicly traded firm brings several 
questions to mind about leadership at these companies.  What is the best 
structure for the board of directors?  What, if any, role should the CEO 
play on the board of directors?  What affect have current rules and regula-
tions had on CEO pay?  With these questions in mind, the authors re-
viewed the empirical literature on corporate governance next. 
Corporate Governance 
Two of the largest bankruptcies in U.S. history at the time, the Enron 
Corporation in 2001, and Worldcom, Inc. in 2002, contributed to the pas-
sage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”) and subsequent new list-
ing rules on the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) and on the National 
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (“NASDAQ”) 
exchange.  The goal of SOX and the new exchange rules was to decrease 
the likelihood of future corporate scandals and accounting fraud through 
improved corporate governance oversight in the United States.  This law 
and the new exchange rules led to heightened public pressure on firms to 
increase board independence (Dah, Frye, & Hurst, 2014; Zorn, Shropshire, 
Martin, Combs, & Ketchen, Jr., 2017).  However, defining “independent 
director” is difficult.  Although aligned in purpose SOX, NYSE, and 
NASDAQ all have their own rules and definitions.  As an illustration of 
the complexity, an excerpt from the NYSE American Company Guide, 
Section 803 on Independent Directors and Audit Committees is provided 
here.  It defines what an independent director is and what an independent 
director is not and explains the requirement: 
 
(A1) Each issuer must have a sufficient number of independent direc-
tors on its board of directors (a) such that at least a majority of 
such directors are independent directors (subject to the exceptions 
set forth in section 801) and (b) to satisfy the audit committee 
requirements set forth below. 
 
(A2) ‘Independent director’ means a person other than an executive of-
ficer or employee of the company. No director qualifies as inde-
pendent unless the issuer’s board of directors affirmatively deter-
mines that the director does not have a relationship that would 
interfere with the exercise of independent judgement in carrying 
out the responsibilities of a director. 
 
In addition to the requirements contained in this Section 803A: (i) 
directors serving on audit committees must also comply with the 
additional, more stringent requirements set forth in Section 
803B(2) below; and (ii) directors serving on compensation com-
mittees and, in the case of a company that does not have a com-
pensation committee, all independent directors, must also comply 
with the additional, more stringent requirements set forth in Sec-
tion 805(c) below. The following is a non-exclusive list of persons 
who shall not be considered independent: 
 
(a) A director who is, or during the past three years was, em-
ployed by the company, other than prior employment as an 
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interim executive officer (provided the interim employment 
did not last longer than one year) 
 
(b) A director who accepted or has an immediate family mem-
ber who accepted any compensation from the company in 
excess of $120,000 during any period of twelve consecutive 
months within the three years preceding the determination 
of independence, other than the following: 
 
(i) compensation for board or board committee service, 
 
(ii) compensation paid to an immediate family member who 
is an employee (other than an executive officer) of the com-
pany, 
 
(iii) compensation received for former service as an interim 
executive officer (provided the interim employment did not 
last longer than one year) (See Commentary .08), or 
 
(iv) benefits under a tax-qualified retirement plan, or non-
discretionary compensation; 
 
(c)  A director who is an immediate family member of an indi-
vidual who is, or at any time during the past three years was, 
employed by the company as an executive officer; 
 
(d) A director who is, or has an immediate family member who 
is, a partner in, or a controlling shareholder or an executive 
officer of, any organization to which the company made, or 
from which the company received, payments (other than 
those arising solely from investments in the company's se-
curities or payments under non-discretionary charitable 
contribution matching programs) that exceed 5% of the or-
ganization's consolidated gross revenues for that year, or 
$200,000, whichever is more, in any of the most recent three 
fiscal years; 
 
(e)  A director who is, or has an immediate family member who 
is, employed as an executive officer of another entity where 
at any time during the most recent three fiscal years any of 
the issuer's executive officers serve on the compensation 
committee of such other entity; or 
 
(f)  A director who is, or has an immediate family member who 
is, a current partner of the company's outside auditor, or was 
a partner or employee of the company's outside auditor who 
worked on the company's audit at any time during any of the 
past three years. 
 
(A3) In the case of an investment company, in lieu of Sections 803A(2) 
(a) through (f), a director who is an "interested person" of the in-
vestment company as defined in Section 2(a)(19) of the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940, other than in his or her capacity as a 
member of the board of directors or any board committee (NYSE, 
2018). 
 
Although establishing rules and defining independent director is com-
plicated, SOX, NYSE, and NASDAQ rules are in accord that only a ma-
jority of independent directors is required.  Despite this mutual assess-
ment, firms have been increasingly adopting a lone-insider board struc-
ture (Gordon, 2007; Linck, Netter, & Yang, 2008).  In fact, more than half 
of S&P 1500 companies have lone-insider boards (Zorn et al., 2017).  This 
means the CEO is “the only current employee [serving] on the board of 
directors” (Zorn, et al., 2017, p. 2,623).  Dah et al. (2014) proposed that 
public opinion and public pressure were the impetus for this change in 
board structure.  For example, Zingales (2000) explained how public opin-
ion and pressure were used at Sears to make the firm change its corporate 
governance to a lone-insider board structure.  Other studies also found 
firms decreased the number of insider directors or increased the number 
of independent directors on the board in response to public pressure and 
concerns over firm reputation (Dah, et al., 2014; Wu, 2004).   
Despite the growing trend toward a lone-insider board structure at pub-
licly traded firms, there is support for the idea that it leads to higher CEO 
pay (Staw, McKechnie, & Puffer, 1983; Westphal & Zajac, 1994).  Addi-
tionally, when there are other insiders on the board, CEO pay is lower.  In 
their research study, Zorn et al. (2017) found that one or more inside di-
rectors beyond the CEO added value by contributing to lower CEO pay, 
lower pay gaps between the CEO and the top management team, lower 
occurrences of financial misconduct, and better firm performance.  
To recap, our review of the literature shows that publicly traded firms 
have been slowly responding to public pressure to move towards employ-
ing fewer inside directors on their boards.  In many instances, this is taken 
to the extreme where all members of the board of directors are independent 
except for the lone-insider CEO.  This occurs despite the fact that SOX, 
NYSE, and NASDAQ rules only require a majority of independent direc-
tors.  Further, empirical evidence shows that having at least one additional 
insider on the board of directors, besides the CEO, contributes to lower 
CEO pay and other benefits.  Therefore, the authors argue that the negative 
relationship between the Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule and CEO pay will be 
moderated, that is made more negative, by the presence of at least one 
inside director besides the CEO because this will apply further downward 
pressure on CEO pay.  However, the majority of board members must re-
main independent (see Figure 1). 
 
Proposition 2c: The negative relationship between the Pay Ratio Dis-
closure Rule and CEO pay at publicly traded companies is made more 
negative by the presence of one or more inside directors beyond the 
CEO, as long as the majority of board members remain independent. 
 
The idea that the board of directors should be comprised of a majority 
of independent directors (outsiders) as expressed by SOX, NYSE, and 
NASDAQ rules is supported further by agency theory.   
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Agency Theory 
As a matter of fact, one of the key tenants of agency theory is that 
boards must be comprised of a majority of outsiders, in other words direc-
tors employed neither by the firm nor from affiliated firms that depend on 
the company (Bednar, 2012; Fama, 1980).  However, a majority of out-
siders does not mean all outsiders except for the CEO, which would make 
the CEO the lone-insider.  This is because lone-insider CEOs are able to 
use their power to justify higher pay by claiming credit for high perfor-
mance, while simultaneously blaming external causes for poor perfor-
mance (Staw, McKechnie, & Puffer, 1983; Westphal & Zajac, 1994).  In 
fact, some studies suggest that lone-insider boards can actually weaken 
corporate governance (Liu & Jiraporn, 2010; Adams, Almeida, & Ferreira, 
2005).   
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Our review of the empirical literature indicates that a lone-insider CEO 
on the board of directors allows the CEO too great an advantage over the 
board when it comes to personal compensation.  This is because the lone-
insider CEO is truly the only expert on the company board due to being 
the only insider.  A board that consists of all outsiders may bring interest-
ing new ways of seeing things, but little expertise.  Thus, the board of 
directors will rely heavily on the CEO for guidance.  When the board relies 
heavily on the CEO, he or she becomes more entrenched.  As previously 
discussed, even the presence of one other company insider on the board of 
directors can reduce the CEO’s power over personal compensation.   
Therefore, the authors argue that the negative relationship between the Pay 
Ratio Disclosure Rule and CEO pay is made more positive by the presence 
of a lone-insider CEO on the board of directors.  That is to say, it will have 
the opposite effect of the Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule because it will place 
upward pressure on CEO pay (see Figure 1).  
 
Proposition 2d: The negative relationship between the Pay Ratio Dis-
closure Rule and CEO pay at publicly traded companies is made more 
positive by the presence of a lone-insider CEO on the board of direc-
tors. 
 
According to Homroy (2016) increased stakeholder interest in corpo-
rate governance has coincided with higher levels of CEO turnover.  He 
studied samples from the S&P 1500 indices between 1993 and 2011 
(Homroy, 2016).  He found that the rapid rise in CEO compensation dur-
ing those years was due to an increase in forced turnover risk by investi-
gating CEOs who received higher than average severance pay entitlements 
(Homroy, 2016).  He found that these CEOs received higher levels of an-
nual compensation in addition to higher severance packages (Homroy, 
2016). 
The authors argue that if a CEO experiences an increased threat of be-
ing fired for any reason, then it places upward pressure on the CEO’s pay.  
An increase in forced turnover risk, is evidenced by a higher severeance 
package.  This is sometimes referred to as a golden parachute because it 
protects the executive in the event of termination.  This arrangement is 
also given to executives when there is a high probability that a merger or 
acquisition will take place.  Regardless, if there is a higher risk that the 
CEO may be terminated for any reason, then the CEO’s pay will be higher.  
For this reason, the authors propose that the negative relationship between 
the Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule and CEO pay will be offset by elevated 
forced turnover risk for the CEO.  In other words, the increased risk of 
being fired will have a positive relation with (will apply upward pressure 
on) the CEO’s pay (see Figure 1). 
 
Proposition 2e: The negative relationship between the Pay Ratio Dis-
closure Rule and CEO pay at publicly traded companies is made more 
positive by CEO elevated forced turnover risk. 
 
It is interesting to note that a majority of severance packages are cash 
not company stock options and that increased pay incentives from forced 
turnover risk include cash as well as non-cash items (Homroy, 2016).  In 
this way, the CEO is further protected from the volatility associated with 
company ownership.   
Mazur and Wu (2016) found a relationship between executive owner-
ship and CEO pay.  They studied firms on the S&P 600 SmallCap Index 
between 2002 and 2005 and found lower CEO incentive pay in family 
owned firms, “where the founder or a descendant of the founder sits on 
the board and/or is a blockholder” and where “at least two board members 
are related either by blood or marriage” (p. 1,103).  A blockholder is a 
large-percentage shareholder in a firm (Holderness, 2009).  Additionally, 
Mazur and Wu (2016) found that CEO incentive pay decreased even more 
with higher levels of executive ownership (Mazur and Wu, 2016).  They 
explained that at family owned firms, the average ownership stake is about 
17%, while blockholders held an average of 39% of the company’s stock 
(Mazur and Wu, 2016).  It is interesting that in general as CEO company 
ownership has decreased, CEO pay has increased.  Jensen and Murphy 
(1990) pointed out that median stock holdings of inside CEOs declined 
during the years 1938 to 1984 from 0.3 % to 0.03%, respectively, and it 
does not appear to have increased since then.  Interestingly, substantial 
increases in CEO pay began to occur in the late 1970s (Mishel & Davis, 
2015) and has continued to this day.   
To reiterate, our review of the literature shows that CEO pay has in-
creased simultaneously as CEO ownership in firms has declined.  Addi-
tionally, the empirical literature suggests that higher levels of CEO own-
ership (and corresponding dependence on increased dividends) and less 
compensation in the form of bonuses will result in lower CEO pay.  There-
fore, the authors argue that the negative relationship between the Pay Ratio 
Disclosure Rule and CEO pay is moderated, that is made more negative, 
by higher levels of executive ownership because it will apply additional 
downward pressure on CEO pay (see Figure 1).  Therefore, we make the 
following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2f: The negative relationship between the Pay Ratio Dis-
closure Rule and CEO pay at publicly traded companies is made more 
negative by high levels of executive ownership. 
 
Agency theory (Fama, & Jensen, 1983) also claims that in firms where 
CEO duality does not exist, in other words when the roles of CEO and 
Chairman of the Board are kept separate, the company will lack a unity in 
leadership but it gains increased independent oversight (Boyd, 1995; 
Finkelstein, & D’Aveni, 1994; Rechner & Dalton, 1991).  This lines up 
with the ideas of organization theory. 
Organization Theory 
Classical organization theory claims that when CEO duality exists in a 
firm, meaning the role of CEO and Chairman of the Board are combined, 
the company will enjoy clear leadership (Boyd, 1995; Fayol 1949/1967) 
but with a heightened risk of managerial entrenchment (Finkelstein, & 
D’Aveni, 1994; Krause, Withers, & Semadeni, 2017).  Managerial en-
trenchment contributed to the rapid rise of CEO pay (Bebchuk & Fried, 
2003) because these managers possess enough power to extract higher lev-
els of compensation from the firm.   
Both agency theory and classical organization theory on CEO duality 
have been tested with little empirical support found for either idea (Dalton, 
Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & Dalton, 2007).  
As pointed out by Larcker and Tayan (2015) empirical evidence does not 
support the idea that the chair of the board should always be independent; 
no relationship was found between chair independence and operating per-
formance (Baliga, Moyer, & Rao, 1996; Boyd, 1995).  However, one 
study found evidence that forced separation of the CEO from the chair 
position due to investor pressure resulted in subsequent decreased operat-
ing performance (Dey, Engel, & Liu, 2011). 
There is a third theoretical option.  Preserving CEO duality (Krause, 
Withers, & Semadeni, 2017) while also appointing a lead independent di-
rector, which is a leader chosen from among the independent directors 
(Lipton & Lorsch, 1992).  The lead independent director serves as adviser 
to the CEO, is responsible for the CEO’s performance review, and can fill 
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in for the CEO should the CEO quit or be terminated.  Krause, Withers, & 
Semadeni (2017) proposed this idea as a way to preserve leadership unity 
while allowing for increased oversight.  They found that “lead independ-
ent director appointment can improve firm performance, but only if the 
CEO is not very powerful” (Krause, Withers, & Semadeni, 2017, p. 
2,260).  CEO power is difficult to define.  There is no consensus in the 
scholarly literature.  However, the authors believe that power is deter-
mined by how entrenched the CEO is.  For example, if the board of direc-
tors perceives the CEO as difficult to replace, then the CEO is entrenched, 
and can demand higher pay among other things.  On the other hand, if the 
board perceives the CEO as replaceable, then the CEO has less power be-
cause he or she is less entrenched. 
The impact of a lead independent director on CEO pay is yet to be in-
vestigated, but it seems rational that if the CEO is not entrenched, a lead 
independent director could assist in the containment of the CEO’s pay.  As 
previously explained, research does show that the presence of one or more 
insiders on the board beyond the CEO, as long as the majority of board 
members are independent, does contribute to lower CEO pay.  Therefore, 
it stand to reason that the presence of a lead independent director will fur-
ther reduce CEO pay do to his or her closeness with the CEO and increased 
influence over other board members, but only if the CEO is not very pow-
erful. Meaning, the CEO is not entrenched (see Figure 1).  
 
Proposition 2g: The negative relationship between the Pay Ratio Dis-
closure Rule and CEO pay at publicly traded companies is made more 
negative by the presence of a lead independent director, but only if the 
CEO is not entrenched. 
Summary 
The implementation of the Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule will inform a 
wide variety of stakeholders about pay disparity between CEOs and the 
employees who work for them at many publicly traded firms.  As a result, 
firms will experience increased public pressure from stakeholders to re-
duce pay disparity in the United States.  Firms will respond to the increas-
ing pressure by slowly making the effort to lower CEO pay a CSR initia-
tive.  The literature indicates that public opinion and public pressure on 
firms can result in changes even at the highest levels of organizations.  
This supports the idea that stakeholder pressure on firms to lower CEO 
pay will actually work.  Additional moderating variables will either in-
crease or decrease the downward pressure on CEO pay (see Figure 1).   
The authors believe five factors will add to the downward pressure on 
CEO pay.  Two factors will cause CEO pay to move higher, offsetting the 
effects of the Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule at publicly traded firms. 
Conclusions 
Considering corporate governance policy, the rules provided by SOX, 
NYSE, and NASDAQ only require a majority of independent directors.  
Further, they define what an independent director is and is not.  However, 
the rules fall short in preventing the occurrence of lone-insider boards.  
This is despite the fact well established theory and empirical evidence 
show lone-insider boards yield higher occurrences of financial miscon-
duct, lower company performance, and higher CEO pay at publicly traded 
firms.  The rules need updating to include the meaning of “majority of 
independent directors.”  New rules should be implemented to establish 
how many directors a publicly traded firm should have based on company 
net asset value or some other quantifiable means.  The new rules should 
also require a minimum number of inside directors beyond the CEO in 
order to prevent loan-insider boards while maintaining a majority of inde-
pendent directors.  The evidence also indicates that a rule should be cre-
ated requiring the independent directors at a firm to choose from amongst 
themselves a lead independent director to serve as an adviser to the CEO.  
As an adviser, the lead independent director will provide additional over-
sight, which will help reduce financial misconduct, increase company per-
formance, and lower CEO pay at publicly traded firms.  
Boards of directors need to be more active in self-monitoring.  The au-
thors recommend the formation of a self-governing body similar to the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), which over-
sees the public accounting industry.  This governing body of board direc-
tors could set policies and procedures regarding topics such as CEO com-
pensation and executive ownership allowing capitalism an opportunity to 
fix itself.  It may be cliché to suggest that the rich are getting richer and 
the poor are getting poorer.  However, when it comes to executive pay, the 
evidence is overwhelming.  Corporate leaders should come together and 
find a solution, or the government will likely do it for them. 
Limitations 
First, changes in U.S. laws including SOX and the Dodd-Frank Act cre-
ated a divergence in the regulations governing U.S. corporations in com-
parison to foreign corporations.  Non-U.S. governments made different 
changes to their laws making the divergence even greater (Welsh, 
Spender, Fannon, & Hall, 2014).  This means that a study on the impact 
of the Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule will be limited to the United States.  
However, stakeholders in other countries should be interested in the out-
come of the rule in the United States as similar laws might yield similar 
results abroad.  Second, there may be other moderating factors, which 
have not been captured in the current literature review.  Third, the gap 
between CEO and worker pay can also be reduced by increasing worker 
pay while keeping CEO pay unchanged, or by lowering CEO pay 
and simultaneously increasing worker pay.  However, the authors 
are not convinced that the exponential growth of CEO pay since 
the 1980’s can be offset by increases in worker pay in any mean-
ingful way.  Nonetheless, those effects should be investigated fur-
ther.  Finally, it may be necessary to wait for several years before the true 
effect of the Pay Ratio Disclosure rule can be measured due to firm lead-
ership inertia, which will gradually give way to stakeholder pressure (van 
Halderen, et al., 2016). 
Contribution 
This literature review and its propositions contribute to CSR theory, 
stakeholder theory, corporate governance theory, agency theory, organi-
zation theory, and equity theory in regards to CEO pay and corporate gov-
ernance structure.  Further, a majority of Americans care about CEO com-
pensation.  The authors hope corporate leaders and others involved in set-
ting rules and policies on corporate governance are informed and influ-
enced by our findings.  Our suggestions to update the rules and establish 
a self-governing body to oversee boards of directors in the United States 
could have a substantial effect on a variety of stakeholders, such as con-
sumers, investors, employees, and many others.  
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Figure 1. Model of the Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule and seven moderating variables influencing CEO pay at publicly traded firms. 
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